The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of competition and regulation on Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) outcomes in India. Using data for 60 MFIs from the MIX Market database for a period of five years from 2008-09 to 2012-13, panel models are estimated for the empirical examinations. In the modeling framework, constructed Lerner's Index as competition proxy and regulate dummy as regulatory intervention proxy are introduced as interest variables along with the MFI specific and Macro specific control variables to examine their effect on MFIs outcomes. The study reveals that competition strengthens the outreach, promotes operating efficiency, deteriorates the loan portfolio quality and adversely affects the MFIs profitability. While the regulatory intervention creates some accommodative space for the MFI borrowers, improves MFIs efficiency partially and dampens loan repayments and portfolio quality and profitability via "roe" in India. Our results have also implications on MFIs, fund provider, regulator, government and policy research practitioners. This study contributes towards filling gap in the literature by extending the analysis of the effect of competition and regulation on MFI outcomes to a cross-section of states in India in a panel data framework.
Theoretical Economics Letters banks and specialized financial institutions [1] . Further proliferation of commercial orientation and "for profit" MFIs in the marketplace have rapidly increased competition among MFIs in several countries [2] . In a competitive setting, degree of competition has a bearing on the performance, efficiency, outreach, profitability [3] indebtedness [4] , service quality [2] , product innovation and development and diversity [5] . However, to ensure the healthy competition in the microfinance industry, governments in many economies have put in place strict regulations. Regulatory intervention of Andhra Pradesh Government in 2010 followed by Reserve Bank of India regulation for entire India has largely impacted the MFIs in the country. However, there are few systematic empirical evidences for such a claim being made. As the effect of competition and regulation on MFI outcomes are highly understudied in India, and this being such an important area from the strategic perspective, this study makes an attempt to fill this gap in the existing stock of microfinance literature.
The specific objectives of this study are 1) to examine the effect of competition on MFIs outreach, loan repayment, efficiency and financial performance in the Indian microfinance Industry and 2) to examine the effect of regulatory intervention on MFIs outreach, loan repayment, efficiency and financial performance in the Indian microfinance industry. The outcome of this study would influence the diverse stakeholders of microfinance including MFIs, beneficiaries, donor agencies, liquidity providers, market regulator and both state and central governments in India. The rest of the paper is organized under four sections. Section 2 identifies the gap by reviewing the literature relating to the effect of competition and regulation on MFI outcomes and thereby develops the hypotheses for the study. Data and methodology used in this study is presented in section 3.
The preliminary and empirical results are captured in the section 4. Section 5 provides the discussion of the findings and the reasons associated thereof. Conclusion, limitations, contributions and future scope of the study are narrated in the last section.
Hypotheses Development

Competition and MFI Outcomes
The efficient structure hypothesis posits a reverse causality between competition and efficiency [6] . Earle and Estrin [7] explore the inverse relationship between competition and firm performance. Navajas, et al. [8] report that outcome of competition is ambiguous since competition lead to innovation and in turn expanding outreach. However, researchers have also found that competition reduces the ability of lenders to cross-subsidize less profitable smaller loans. Vogelgesang's [4] study reveals that competition prompts multiple borrowings and higher levels of borrower indebtedness. McIntosh and Wydick [9] reveal that competition increase information asymmetry which deteriorates the loan portfolio quality and in turn loan delinquencies in the multi-lender market [10] . Berger et al. [11] find that large firms' competitive pressures have more deleterious The wide variations in operating costs across MFIs are observed, often within the same geographical region, which is attributed to competition [12] [13] .
Competition also affects the financial stability of the financial institutions [14] .
On the other hand, Kai [15] suggests that competition does not affect the financial self-sufficiency but negatively affect wider outreach where such a negative impact declines with increase in MFIs experience. Competition among lenders for external funds can lead to higher aggregate poverty reduction and food security [1] [16] . The competition among MFIs may influence the micro credit market dynamics by lowering the interest rate and in turn improve the service access to poor clients [17] . Assefa, et al. [3] suggests that intense competition is overall, negatively associated with the MFIs performances.
Though literature on the effect of competition on MFI outcomes are quite exhaustive, still it has remained inconclusive, which varies across the market.
Keeping the competition and MFI outcomes literature in mind, following four set of hypotheses are tested in this study:
H1 
Regulation and MFI Outcomes
Effect of regulation on firm performance is amply studied in strategic finance literature. However, the effect of regulation on MFIs outcomes is highly understudied in the strategic finance literature. Regulations also influence the other contextual factors in the macro-environment of a firm, particularly smaller firms, and such effect may be more important for organizations such as MFIs, many of which operate on a small scale [18] . Cull et al. [19] shows empirical evidence that demonstrates that supervision is negatively associated with profitability but with larger average loan sizes and lesser lending to women. Christen and Rosenberg [20] report that compliance with prudential regulations could cost a MFI 5% of assets in the first year and 1% or more thereafter. Ndambu [21] claims that the regulatory status neither increases the operational self-sufficiency [23] demonstrate that more stringent prudential regulation increases MFI profitability and decreases in outreach. Hartarska and Nadolnyak [24] affirm that regulatory intervention neither directly affects operational self-sustainability nor outreach of MFIs. However, it is the less leveraged MFIs who are having better financial sustainability. Further, Assefa, et al. [3] suggest that the adverse effect of competition can be overcome by ensuring lending standards, enhancing information sharing and promoting efficiency.
Review of literature ascribes the importance of regulation in the context of 
Data and Methodology
Nature and Sources of Data
Empirical examination is based on the secondary data which have been obtained from diverse sources. However, the MIX market database is the major source of data. The competition and regulation are two interest variable in our study and these variables are constructed using the annual MIX market data. All other MFI specific control variables are also obtained from the MIX market data. However, to measure the extent of competition across the firms within the respective industries. The formula used for computing competition is: LI = (P − MC)/P.
Constructs and Variables
Where "P" is the average revenue and MC is marginal cost. Following the estimation procedures of Guevara and Maudos [25] , output price (P) is computed as the ratio of operating income to total asset. The marginal cost is derived from the following estimated the translog cost function: C is the total cost of the firm "i" at year "t". The explanatory variable , i t y represents output of firm "i" at year "t" and , , j i t w are "j" input prices of the firm "i" at year "t". In estimating input prices of the firms, we have assumed two factor input prices such as labour (w1) and capital (w2). The cost of labor is computed as a ratio of personal expenses to total number of employees and the cost of capital is computed as the ratio of operating expenses without personnel expenses to net fixed asset. Following the Hermes, et al. [26] translog cost function specification, we have estimated the cost frontier including a time trend, where total cost is sum of the operating and financial costs of the firm "i" at year "t". The rationale of inclusion of time trend in cost frontier estimation is to capture the effect of technological change and firm specific fixed effect to deal with the unobserved firm heterogeneity in the industry and associated difference in cost.
The marginal cost (MC) of the firm "i" at year "t" is derived by taking the derivative of the total cost function with respect to Loan Repayment: The loan portfolio quality and how well the MFI is collecting its loans are also other indicators of MFI performance. A MFI lender's ability to collect loans is critical for its success and if delinquency is not kept to very low levels, it can quickly spin out of control. Furthermore, loan collection has proved to be a strong proxy for general management competence. Following Assefa, et al. [3] , we include portfolio at risk greater than 30 days (PAR30) and 90 days (PAR90) as MFI loan repayment performance in this study. These measures help us to assess loan repayment performance of clients and portfolio quality of MFIs.
Efficiency: Lending institutions overall efficiency is generally measured by operating expenses ratio (OER). Following the literature [3] , operating efficiency ratio (oer) and cost per borrower (cpb) have been used as proxies for efficiency measure of MFIs. A given MFI is usually regarded as having become more efficient when the "oer" and "cpb" get lower [3] .
Profitability: Following the existing literature [3] , four proxies such as opera- 
is a vector of other MFI characterized explanatory variables attached to MFI "i" located in state "j" and at time period "t", , j t z is a vector of macro characterized state level variables linked with the MFIs located in state "j" and at time period "t", and T represents the time trend. It is a panel data equation, where we apply a Hausman test to compare between fixed and random effects estimates. Trend is also included in the regression since it would be unreasonable to assume the relation between competition, regulation and MFIs performance is constant over time. We have engaged the generalized linear model (GLM) as a model estimation strategy, which allows for response variables that have error distribution models other than a normal distribution.
Results and Discussions
Preliminary Findings
The descriptive statistics for the two explanatory variables (competition and regulation) and all dependent variables (outreach, efficiency, repayment and performance) are presented in Table 2 .
The results suggest that the mean value of the Lerner's Index (LI) is 0.392, which suggests that the competition among MFIs is high. The descriptive statistics also suggest that about 62% of MFIs are regulated and 69% of MFIs under MFIs under investigation. Further, the skewness and kurtosis statistics suggests that the total asset distribution is highly asymmetric having fat tails in its distribution structure. Further, he high standard deviation attached to "nab" indicates that MFI active borrowers' base is quite diversified in India. However, the highest geographic concentration is observed to be in south and lowest in the north eastern regions of India (results not reported here). The skewness and kurtosis result also suggest that "nab" distribution across MFIs are asymmetric and a fewer number of MFIs are having relatively larger "nab" compared to many others. The average "albpb" suggests that Indian MFIs supports small size loans.
The mean and standard deviation of two operational efficiency constructs i.e.
"cpb" and "oer" are observed to be 18.97 and 0.1342 and 24.75 and 0.08213 respectively, which suggest that MFIs are operating efficiently with low operating risk. While the mean and standard deviation of two repayment proxies i.e. 
Main Findings and Discussions
This section is organized under two sub-sections i.e. univariate analysis and Univariate Results Analysis: An attempt is made here to find out how LI as a Theoretical Economics Letters Table 3 . Before analyzing the univariate results, it is worth theorizing that increasing competition in a microfinance lending market space would be characterized by decreasing LI and vice versa. While analyzing the effect of competition on outreach, it is observed that LI is inversely associated with the "nab" and "albpb" of MFIs. That means, increasing competition among MFIs significantly increases their active borrower and loan size base and vice versa.
This could be due to the unsaturated rural microfinance market with higher number of unbanked population. To capture this unsaturated market, MFIs are perhaps luring the customers with diverse promotional plans, products and benefits, extending high value loans and creating better socio economic awareness among unbanked population. Our results here don't support the findings of Assefa, et al. [3] . The loan repayment proxies "par30" and "par 90" are negatively affected by the competition proxy LI at 5% level of significance. That means competition deteriorates the repayment performance and rising default rates of the loan portfolio (Table 3) .
While examining the univariate results associated with the effect of competition on MFI efficiency it reveals that both "oer" and cpb are positively affected by competition. But the level of significance associated with the loading proxies suggests that the positive effect of competition is strongly felt on "oer" compared to "cpb", which technically suggests that competition has very marginal effect on "cpb". However, the effect of competition on MFI profitability measured via "oss", "pm", "roa", and "roe" are adversely affected at an accepted level of significance. The loadings and the level of significance statistics for all the four performance proxies suggest that competition has a strong damaging effect on "pm" 
Effect of Competition on MFI Outcomes
While investigating the effect of competition on MFI outreach the results suggest that competition significantly promotes MFI's active borrower and loan size. The result here partially does not lend support to the earlier literature [3] , who contend that intense competition negatively affects wider outreach in terms of number of active borrowers and share of women borrowers. Thus, the empirical results reject both the null hypotheses under H1.1, which affirm that competition rather promotes the MFIs outreach (Table 4) . That means, competition among MFIs significantly promotes their active borrower and loan size base. The positive effect of competition on MFI outreach in Indian could be due to the dependence of large unbanked rural and tribal population on informal finance and more responsible lending owing to appropriate regulation. Further in such unbanked and unsaturated informal financial market, the active promotional lending activities of the MFIs could have also widen the outreach and lending relatively larger loans to their clients so as to reap higher interest income. However, this study is not intending to prove whether compared to the client base growth, the loan book growth is much higher, indicating more money is given to the same client, which is a risky situation. This may be examined in a further study.
The results in the previous section reveal that MFIs are extending higher amount of loans to their customers over the period and enlarging their borrowing base. No doubt the loans are MFIs' largest assets and also the largest source Table 4 .
The results here affirm that MFI loan portfolios don't remain steady, and has shown significant uptick in delinquencies. The coefficients attached to both delinquency indicators are statistically significant at 10% level. The study reports that there is decline in loan repayment performance and worsening of loan portfolio quality as a result of intense competition among MFIs. This result supports both the specific hypotheses under H1.2 that competition erodes the MFI portfolio quality both for 30 days and 90 days respectively. Thus it is concluded that there is a significant rise in loan delinquency and default rates due to competition. The results here support the study [3] Table   4 .
The estimated result reveals that "oer" and "cpb" are negatively related with LI. However, it is only the "oer" observed to be significant at 1% level of significance, which suggests that competition positively affects "oer". MFIs have two main cost components finance costs (fees and interest on borrowings) and operating costs (admin and overhead costs and employee costs). The result here is mixed and we reject our alternative hypothesis (H1. are also reported both in Table 4 .
While investigating the effect of regulatory intervention on MFI outreach, we find inconclusive results, where regulatory intervention promotes the "nab" and erodes the "albpb". The empirical results here reject H2.1.1 and accept H2.1.2
and affirm that regulatory intervention rather promotes the MFIs active borrowers base, and erodes MFIs loan size at 5% level of significance (Table 4 ). Our conjecture is seen to have been partially true that the regulatory intervention has promoted wider outreach (measured by "nab") and it has eroded the depth of outreach (measured by "albpb") in the Indian microfinance market. We may perceive that number of active borrowers' base has gone up could have been due to more responsible lending owing to appropriate regulation.
State regulatory intervention might have affected the portfolio quality and financial stability of MFIs. While examining the effect of regulation on MFI loan repayment via "par30" and "par90" in a full modeling framework, it is observed that regulation has a significantly negative effect on loan repayment proxies. The results here confirm two specific hypotheses under H2.2 and thus confirm that regulatory intervention has eroded MFI loan quality.
While examining the effect of state regulation on MFIs financial efficiency, the results are found to be inconclusive, which is reported in the column 5 and 6 of 
Conclusions and Implications
The effect of competition and regulation on MFI outcomes has not been much Thus, the study, on the one hand concludes that competition strengthens the outreach; induce to operating efficiency, deteriorates the loan portfolio quality and adversely affects the MFIs profitability. On the other, the regulatory intervention creates some accommodative space for the MFI borrowers, improves
MFIs efficiency partially and dampens loan repayments and portfolio quality and profitability via "roe" in India.
This study enhances our understanding on the effect of competition and regulation on MFIs outreach, loan repayment and portfolio quality, efficiency and financial performance in India. This study contributes towards filling gap in the literature by extending the analysis of the effect of competition and regulation on MFI outcomes to a cross-section of states in India in a panel data framework.
Our results have also implications on MFIs, fund provider, regulator, government and policy research practitioners. The findings may influence the MFIs to redesign their products and services to promote outreach, efficiency and profitability and find the way out for information sharing among them to improve portfolio quality and reduce loan defaults in the face of intense competition. However, there is a need for verifying these results in a broader panel framework before using this study results for the regulation and public policy provisioning.
The study is not free from limitations, as we have analyzed only a restricted panel data set due to non-availability of data both for cross section and time series.
However, our results would no doubt ignite further discourse on understanding the effect of competition and regulation on MFIs outcome in general and India in particular.
